The Enforcement of Intellectual Property in Free Trade Agreements: The next step in the progression of IP protection by Vasdekas, Nicholas Adam
 
Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan 




TERM  :  Winter 2013 
 
 
COURSE  :  LHC 489 
 
 
PROFESSOR :  Dana Muir 
 
 
STUDENT  :  Nicholas Adam Vasdekas 
 
 
TITLE : The Enforcement of Intellectual Property in Free Trade 
Agreements: The next step in the progression of IP protection 
 
 













The Enforcement of Intellectual Property in Free Trade Agreements: 





























































































 I would like to thank Professor Dana Muir for guiding me throughout this whole 
process of writing my first major work. Without her encouragement, positive energy, and 
push, this paper would not have come out the same. Also, I would like to thank John 
Morrow for helping me formula my initial thoughts and unorganized writings.  
 I would also like to acknowledge the University of Michigan as a whole for 
giving me the academic opportunities that were certainly the muses for my writings, and 
also the adventures that sparked my interest in Latin American politics and economics. 
 Finally, I would like to thank my family: my father Tom, my mother Dora, and 
my brother Jon Vasdekas. Without their upbringing and environment I would not be 






























 This paper explores the implications that Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) have on 
Intellectual Property (IP) rights. It is commonly believed that Free Trade Agreements, in 
their nature of lowering barriers to international trade, lead to many instances of IP 
infringement. These cases span throughout trade and hurt business profits and images. 
This problem has been addressed in the past through the creation of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) leading to measures passed called the Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, or TRIPS. These measures began the process of protecting 
the high value assets of companies and worked to promote trade between nations of 
varying development.  
 However, in recent years, it has become apparent that the TRIPS measures are not 
completely addressing the problems of IP protection, especially in the case of FTAs. In 
order to diagnose the problems fully, I look into various case studies of FTAs between 
the United States and other countries. By varying the choices between developed, 
underdeveloped, Latin American, North American, and Asian countries, I have looked 
into a large sample size of different situations to gain a clearer picture and isolate the 
problems better. 
 After looking the DR-CAFTA, the US-Chilean FTA, US-Brazilian Agreements, 
and NAFTA, it becomes clear that the problems in IP protection stem from three main 
sources: 1. Lack of enforcement measures 2. Differences in governmental 
development/motivations 3. Faulty legislative and drafting process of FTAs. 
 After revealing these problems, I propose that the best ways in which countries 
taking part in FTAs can protect IP rights is through creating a step-by-step economic 
developmental process, creating better enforcement measures with set times and 
contingency clauses, and finally changing the governments’ mindset on IP protection 
measures as investments rather than costs. 
 The effects of implementing these measures will not only help protect the IP of 
current companies partaking in FTAs, but will incentivize countries to grow together in 
an organic way. By aligning the economic interests of countries this way, the world 
economy will benefit. This benefit will expand trade and production as more companies 
desiring higher IP standards begin taking advantage of free trade. As a whole, industries 
such as pharmaceuticals and agriculture will expand as companies expand internationally, 
reaching areas that would otherwise be untouched through fear of lost profits. As a 
whole, the next step in IP protection, the increase of enforcement measures, is a large 
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 Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), as they lower boundaries of trade between 
nations, have consistently shown a gap in intellectual property (IP) protection. 
Companies have recognized this clear negative trade off as they often avoid taking 
advantage of FTAs. Companies fear that trading and setting up manufacturing in Free 
Trade Zones increases the chance of intellectual property infringement, creating generics 
and “knock off” copies of their valuable products. This lack of IP protection exists due to 
the significant difference in government development between nations participating in 
FTAs. In order to make FTAs more effective in encouraging trade in the international 
economy, companies need to trust that their products’ designs and formulas are safe. To 
do this, certain measures should be taken in order to bolster current IP protection. 
Including economic incentives for less developed countries to increase IP protection and 
revising the FTA negotiation process, will strengthen IP protection greatly. If these key 
measures are implemented correctly, more companies may take advantage of the benefits 
FTAs, increasing world trade.  
 An inquiry into the effects that FTAs have on IP protection requires a proper 
understanding of the history of international trade and intellectual property protection. 
After analyzing the progression of IP protection in history, especially through the lens of 
Free Trade Agreements, I will then explore four different trade agreements in detail, 
analyzing the problems they face in terms of IP protection for companies. After looking 
at the development of countries in the DR-CAFTA Agreement, the US-Chilean FTA, and 
the US-Brazilian trade agreement and understanding the underlying reasons for IP rights 







the NAFTA agreement between the United States and Canada to show an example where 
even first world countries encounter IP protection problems. Once the protection 
problems that FTAs create have been diagnosed, I will analyze the US-Singaporean FTA. 
That is an example of an agreement that has worked extremely well for both parties 
involved in terms of IP protection. Once the reasons behind this success story have been 
ascertained d and properly understood, I will close with suggestions on how the Free 
Trade Agreement draft process should be fundamentally changed in order to better 
protect all stakeholders involved. 
 
Context and History of IP Protection in FTAs 
 In order to properly address the problems with Free Trade Agreements with 
regards to IP rights protection, one must first look at the current measures that affect IP 
protection and the history of IP protection itself. Understanding the development of IP 
protection throughout the years is essential in analyzing the next step in reform to benefit 
countries involved in FTAs. 
 From the beginnings of the studies of modern economics of Adam Smith, it has 
been understood that free trade allows different countries to take advantage of 
comparative advantages, thus lowering aggregate prices of goods and benefiting the 
consumer. After this generally accepted idea from The Wealth of Nations was proposed to 
lawmakers, countries began removing barriers to trade and tariffs set into place during the 
colonial era in order to exploit these advantages and benefit (Irwin, 1). However, despite 
these measures to open up trade, illegal means through smuggling and copying still 







Argentina in the 1800s, networks of contraband trade against the permission of the 
Spanish Royal government existed in order to form trade with countries such as Britain 
and Portugal (Andrews, 11-12). Since this time, countries in Latin America have been 
categorized as promoting contraband trade and lacking intellectual property protection.  
 As economies developed over time and trade closely connected markets, complex 
trading markets in London and New York developed. When these organized trading 
institutions suffered a collapse in the early 20th century, leading to an American Great 
Depression, many countries involved in trade realized their exposure to the risk of trade 
with the United States. As a result, many countries began setting up barriers to protect 
themselves from international trade exposure. In reaction to this, the United States and 
other countries founded the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) following 
World War II. The goal of this organization was to further globalize the world economy 
and lower barriers to trade through a multilateral trade agreement (Irwin, 2). By 1995, 
GATT was transformed into the World Trade Organization (WTO), which would have 
huge implications on IP protection in all forms of trade agreements. 
 The WTO was created in order to unify international trade standards and help 
developing countries have access to the same level of measures as developed countries. 
According to the 23rd Meeting of Health Ministers of Countries of SEAR, the WTO helps 
facilitate “trade as a tool for development… [and] the WTO rules were intended to create 
a ‘level playing field’ so that the full potential of trade could be realized” (Irwin, 2). This 
mission for the WTO shows that the organization facilitates many countries in their 
international trade measures, especially through the process of establishing FTAs with 







to expand international trade between developed and developing nations, while 
implementing standards of IP protection that most developed countries have. This creates 
challenges for developing countries, as increased IP protection creates higher product and 
investment costs for entering companies, thus more barriers to international trade. In 
order to incentivize developed companies to directly invest in developing countries, a 
balance must be struck between the two nations in the FTA rules concerning IP 
protection. An excerpt from NAFTA: the first trade treaty to protect IP rights describes 
the need for this balance in order for an FTA to work for both sides of the agreement: 
The rationale for incorporating intellectual property provisions in a trade 
agreement is to ensure that intellectual property law enforcement is consistent 
with free trade principles of market access and non-discrimination. Trade will be 
inhibited if the laws of one country do not protect the intellectual property of its 
trading partners, but over-zealous enforcement of intellectual property rights can 
also inhibit trade by putting importers at a competitive disadvantage. 
 
 If the IP protection is too costly, then the developing (and often economically 
fragile) country will lose its own incentive to join the agreement. On the other side of this 
agreement, if the IP measures favor the developing country, then some companies will 
not take advantage of the FTA out of fear of losing valuable assets through the creation of 
copied products, formulas, or illegal generics. 
 To further develop the context of the World Trade Organization in the history of 
Free Trade Agreements, one must look at the IP protection measures provided by the 
WTO. The TRIPS and TRIPS-plus measures directly affect the Free Trade Agreement 
negotiation process and create the standards for participating countries’ IP rights 
protection. According to the Beatrice Lindstrom, the TRIPS provisions, which were 







form a “uniform baseline for global intellectual property standards” (Lindstrom, 919). 
This new measure changed the way IP rights (IPR) were enforced throughout the world. 
According to the World Trade Organization, in order for a country to participate in the 
WTO, they must comply with TRIPS and adopt its measures into their own state laws 
(WTO TRIPS General Provision). The TRIPS agreement created a uniform standard for 
every WTO country, and is often used as the basis of measurement for IP protection for a 
country. Countries that comply with WTO, thus the TRIPS agreement, are considered to 
have better protection measures. Although this may be true, it is evident that TRIPS does 
not fully eradicate the IP protection problem that many companies face when establishing 
trade and manufacturing abroad.  
 Countries such as China, Costa Rica, Brazil, and Chile are all a part of the World 
Trade Organization, but still deal with problems protecting the intellectual property that 
companies bring to their country (wto.org). Because TRIPS might have relegated some IP 
problems, but not solved them all, other measures must be added or addressed in order to 
help continue the development of IP protection in FTAs. 
 As discussed, because of the efforts of the WTO with the TRIPS agreement and 
the inclusion of IP protection measures within FTAs themselves, it seems that the 
problem with IP protection is not that it is an unaddressed issue. The efforts by 
lawmakers to include IP protection to entice businesses do not seem to translate as well in 
actual protection. According to Exhibit 1, China and India have very little IP protection 
effectiveness, despite complying with the TRIPS agreement. In contrast, countries such 







 In order to diagnose what is not working in these countries, these measures that 
they include in their FTAs must be compared. A country such as Japan is extremely 
dependant on its technology industry, and as a result, those companies can lobby and 
promote protection measures that help keep Japanese businesses protected. Since these 
Japanese businesses are founded and based in Japan, their incentives to keep intellectual 
property protected are much higher than those in a developing country such as China, 
whose economy relies more heavily on manufacturing than design. Because 
manufacturing companies are the largest number of firms participating in FTAs in China, 
it is evident that the incentives to protect the IP of companies is not as high or prioritized, 
as shown by Exhibit 1. Although the FTAs may have provisions in place in order to make 
sure a country such as China is not creating illegal copies of products, without the 
economic incentives or a reliance on a research and development business environment 
there, the framework of the government is just not set up to protect IP. This is a glaring 
problem that many developing countries face in this trade process. As shown by this 
example, the difference in IP protection between countries seems to not only be from the 
differences in overall development of the government, but also from the types of 
industries that grow within those countries.  
 Since IP protection is addressed in all FTAs drafted presently, the problem with it 
is not that it is not being implemented substantively. Thus, it can be determined that the 
main problem with IP protection lies in its enforcement, as it seems mere words on paper 
in agreements is not enough to prosecute those who infringe on the law and illegally copy 
intellectual property. Through the history of FTAs and IP protection, it is evident that 







right direction in protecting companies. Through the 1990s, with the introduction of the 
WTO and the TRIPS agreements, IP protection was addressed substantively in the law. 
However, I suggest that countries now continue the process of strengthening IP 
protection now by focusing on the enforcement side, since this is the next step in 
development to foster trade and promote free trade. In order to see where FTAs falter in 
enforcing the IP rights law, one must look at examples of agreements between nations 
and discuss the reasoning behind the failure or success in protecting intellectual property. 
 
DR-CAFTA Agreement: Substantive Coverage and IP Protection 
 An example of a problem of IP protection is within the DR-CAFTA agreement, 
which is an FTA between the United States, the Dominican Republic and Central 
American countries including Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua (Cerón and Godoy, 2). When looking into this agreement, one will have to 
look into how each country within the FTA with the US protects its intellectual property. 
After looking into the effectiveness of the TRIPS-plus measures that many DR-CAFTA 
countries have adopted, it is important also to note the levels of development, especially 
for IP protection. A good measure of this development will be the time it takes for each 
country to renew a patent. This measure is useful in finding out the level of IP protection 
development for a country mainly because it shows the efficiency in the bureaucratic 
system of that country. In essence, a country that can more quickly renew a patent is 
considered more developed as it lowers the costs of bureaucracy for a country, which in 







example, how industries are susceptible to certain problems within the IP protection 
enforcement system. 
 According to Alejandro Cerón and Angelina Godoy, it appears that “countries [in 
the DR-CAFTA agreement] have often implemented stronger IP protection than required 
by trade agreements”, suggesting that the members of DR-CAFTA have national 
legislation that is superior to the agreement drafted. In essence, there should be greater 
protection for companies that are taking advantage of the FTA by setting up operations in 
the countries. 
 Before DR-CAFTA was ratified, the history of IP protection in these Central 
American countries seems to be similar to many countries around the world. All members 
of the agreement are members of WTO as of 2000, and thus comply with the TRIPS 
agreement passed alongside the organization. In addition to this, “many of the IP 
provisions DR-CAFTA requires were anticipated by TRIPS, there are several key points 
where the agreement imposes a more stringent standard, on which its implementation has 
therefore required ‘TRIPS-plus’ reforms”, which show that the countries participating in 
DR-CAFTA comply to the highest standards of IP protection (Cerón and Godoy). This is 
also apparent by actually looking at the DR-CAFTA agreement itself. Article 1.3 states 
“the Parties affirm their existing rights and obligations under the TRIPS Agreement and 
intellectual property agreements concluded or administered under the auspices of the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and to which they are party“ (DR-
CAFTA Agreement, Chapter 15-2). This shows the high standards to which these 
developing countries must adhere to when trading with other developed countries, such 







 To understand a more detailed example of the strength of IP protection of DR-
CAFTA, one can look at the patent periods in the free trade provisions. Stronger 
protection in patent rights is usually reflected by a longer patent period, and also a longer 
period for extension period for companies to reapply for their IP to be protected. By 
looking at Exhibit 2, one can see how all of the countries in the DR-CAFTA agreement 
meet the 20 year TRIPS minimum patent period. In addition to this patent period, the 
countries all applied their own national patent laws to make business easier and 
strengthen IP protection. For example, each DR-CAFTA nation specified a period of time 
that they could renew their patents based mainly on bureaucratic delays. For instance, 
Costa Rica applied an 18 month extension after a patent expired for companies to reapply 
their patent. During this time period, the patent still may not be infringed upon. At more 
extreme extension levels, the Dominican Republic allows for a 3 year extension, while 
Guatemala allows for “No limit”, as long as the time is reasonable based on the process. 
This ambiguous “No limit” on extension is up to the interpretation of the government 
when being enforced, and thus could actually allow for a period of greater than 3 years 
(Exhibit 3). These examples only show the lengths that countries in the DR-CAFTA 
agreement have gone in order to incentivize businesses to come and begin distribution or 
manufacturing. Although these incentives do work, the enforcement of the laws that are 
applied seems to be the more difficult next step for countries in the DR-CAFTA 
agreement, exemplified in the Costa Rican situation below.  
Despite all of this work, there still exists a problem of IP protection in the developing 
countries in the DR-CAFTA agreement. For instance, the International Intellectual 







the “Priority Watch List”. This list established by the IIPA serves as a measurement for 
companies to understand where different countries stand in IP protection. The IIPA 
monitors different countries on a case-by-case basis and provides a measurable spectrum 
so companies can objective make choices on trade. In addition to this, the IIPA states in 
its 2010 Special 301 Report on Copyright protection and Enforcement:  
The business software industry reports that the most devastating form of piracy in 
Costa Rica continues to be the use of infringing or unlicensed software by 
legitimate businesses and government agencies. Software legalization in 
government agencies should be an important public policy goal, and it is a 
CAFTA obligation not yet implemented. 
 
This is a major problem, considering that Intel, an extremely large hardware and software 
company, is one of the largest investors in the Costa Rican free trade zone providing over 
2,800 jobs to the country (intel.com). The IIPA clearly states in its report that the Costa 
Rican government is not meeting its CAFTA obligations. This is a clear example 
showing how despite many efforts to include IP protection measures in legislation and 
FTAs, there are still problems with IP protection in countries.  
 The main reasoning behind this lack of IP protection for companies also seems to 
be listed in the IIPA’s report. They claim, “there remain inadequate resources in the 
government agencies necessary to conduct any kind of effective anti- piracy campaigns” 
(IIPA Report). This shows that the Costa Rican government cannot adequately enforce 
the law that it must adhere to under the DR-CAFTA agreement concerning intellectual 
property. In addition to that, the IIPA report also recommends that Costa Rica creates an 
IP enforcement branch of its police force in addition to a “Public Prosecutor’s Office 
specialized in IP matters”. These are enforcement problems that should have been 







 In sum, after looking at the DR-CAFTA agreement and the various measurements 
used to determine IP protection, it is evident that despite having gone above and beyond 
the substantive measures to protect the valuable assets of companies partaking in DR-
CAFTA, there is still a problem in making sure that these assets are not illegally copied, 
thus infringing on measures. After looking at the TRIPS-Plus measures that these nations 
have, their patent extension periods, and the IIPA report, it is clear that despite meeting 
requirement for the FTA, countries such as Costa Rica still lack the enforcement strength 
to deter IPR infringement. 
 
US-Chilean FTA: Problems with Legislative Process and Enforcement 
 Another FTA with problems of IP rights protection is the US-Chilean agreement. 
When looking at this agreement between the US and Chile, it will be extremely important 
not only to analyze the problems in IP protection, but also to look into the root of the 
problems themselves. In the case of the US-Chilean FTA, the process of ratifying the 
agreement was extremely important in the success of the agreement in terms of 
enforcement of IP protection.  
 In the Report of the Industry Functional Advisory Committee (IFAC) on 
Intellectual Property, it is clear that the US-Chilean FTA has its own issues with 
enforcement as well. According to IFAC, “under the TRIPS Agreement, Chile was 
required to have implemented TRIPS-consistent standards for patent and other 
intellectual property no later than January 1, 2000. To date, it has not done so” (IFAC 
Report). This problem shows that passing agreements and joining the WTO is not enough 







countries participating have met and exceeded IP standards such as the TRIPS agreement, 
it is apparent that Chile has yet to, despite forming an agreement with the United States. 
Although they have been signed to the WTO, they still do not meet these measures. In 
order to remedy this, the United States should draft provisions in its FTA to incentivize 
the passage of enforcement measures into the agreement. Specifically, IFAC even states 
that the United States should not allow Chile to approve of any generics of American 
pharmaceuticals until they have ratified TRIPS legislation into their national law. In the 
case with Chile, unlike Costa Rica, it seems that there still are not any laws set to protect 
companies (IFAC Report, 13).  
 In addition to this, the US-Chilean agreement had a fundamental flaw in its 
agreement process. The Chilean government did not fully communicate to all of its 
branches the expectations of the FTA, and merely ratified it without the understanding of 
the executive branch. Elisa Echenique notes: 
The Executive power defines the content of a Treaty (if it is possible to negotiate 
those terms) and the Parliament has nothing to do during the process. The only 
legal faculty of the National Congress consists of approving or rejecting the treaty 
before its ratification. During this procedure the Parliament analyses the treaty as 
a whole, without having the opportunity to discuss particular terms in order to 
change its content. 
 
This shows how during the ratification process of an FTA, the executive branch of the 
Chilean government was mainly involved (Echenique, 4). The Parliament, which has a 
better understanding of the capacity of legislation that Chile can handle, had no say in the 
process other than signing the agreement. Although one might argue that the Parliament 
may refuse to sign the law, the inherent pressure of signing a large agreement with one of 







legislation itself. Because of this inherent weakness in the legislative process for the FTA 
between the US and Chile, it can be no surprise that there is a disconnect between the 
governments when trying enforce measures such as IP protection. 
 Elisa Echenique goes on further to describe the process of a developed country in 
signing an FTA. In the United Sates, both the President and Congress work together to 
negotiate and sing foreign agreements and treaties.  Through the American process, the 
President is allowed to present to Congress the drafts of the treaty before it goes up to 
signing to help in the negotiation process (Echenique, 5). By looking at this example of 
process, one can see how the negotiations become a conversation between the President 
and Congress, rather than a mere presentation for signing, as is apparent by the Chilean 
process. By revising their process to one more similar to the United States, the Chilean 
government would be able to avoid the problem of signing over to measures that they 
cannot adhere to, as done in the US-Chilean FTA case. 
 From the statements above, it seems that Chile passively agrees to FTAs without 
acknowledging real future problems. According to Elisa Echenique: 
Discussions and work developed by the Chilean Parliament shows that FTA 
implementation does not constitute a passive activity for developing countries. On 
the contrary, in the Chilean case, authorities were concerned about its 
implementation and how to make it compatible with local needs. 
 
This clearly shows that the Chilean Parliament was looking to improve its situation as a 
developing country, however it did not do so at all costs. The government carefully 
looked at the legislation and truly believed it could fully implement the measures of the 
FTA with the United States. Although this may be true, the reality is that pure discussion 







This case is a great example of how even a locally thought out process may not be easily 
implemented. Although Chile did look at the obligations it had to complete in order to be 
in the FTA, it did not anticipate the difficulty it would have implementing those 
measures. In order to alleviate this difficulty for developing nations, it is clear that a 
country such as Chile will need a laid out process for improvement.  
 The case of the US-Chilean FTA shows well that the process of drafting and 
signing an FTA is critical when it comes to enforcement of measures such as IP 
protection. Although the Chilean government has the best intensions of ensuring both 
parties in the trade agreement are equally benefitted, its inherently weak legislative 
process creates risk for American firms looking to establish trade in Chile. As a result, it 
is evident that the Chilean Parliament and Executive branch of government must revise 
their process to solve this problem of enforcement. In sum, a legislative process where 
the whole government is not included in drafting the FTA leads to less protection. 
 
US-Brazilian Trade Effects on Pricing and Negotiations 
 In order to understand the implications that the trade agreements between the 
United States and Brazil, it is extremely important to know the industries that dominate 
the trade between the nations and the history of the law that dictates the trade of those 
industries. Also, the United States and Brazil do not have a formal FTA currently in 
place, but do in fact trade on written agreements resembling the FTAs mentioned earlier. 
In Brazil, the pharmaceutical industry is extremely important, as its comparative 
advantage of cheaper labor and natural resources create an environment where the 







HIV/AIDS, much like India, in 1970, Brazil “passed intellectual property laws that did 
not allow the patenting of pharmaceutical products” (2). One might believe that this 
extremely liberating piece of legislation would bring a great reform in access to 
pharmaceutical drugs to those in need, especially in third world countries.  However, the 
effect of this legislation actually led to American companies to not allow their formulas 
within the borders of countries such as Brazil and India. This subsequently led to even 
less access to pharmaceuticals for people within those countries. According to Albert 
Fishlow, without any form of IP protection, “pharmaceutical firms in the United States 
(and Europe) were appalled” (Fishlow, 287). This distrust in the Brazilian government 
has led many companies such as Merck and Pfizer to avoid selling many prescription 
medications there. For example, according to a 2012 Bloomberg article, the Brazilian 
government is pressuring Merck, Pfizer, and GlaxoSmithKline Plc to cut prices of their 
AIDS medications currently being sold. These drugs are apparently already being sold at 
15% of the price in the United States, already hurting the profits of these pharmaceutical 
companies. The pressures the Brazilian government places upon these pharmaceutical 
firms does not promote the trade of these drugs within the country, but actually hinders 
the ability of firms to remain profitable. 
 In reaction to these new measures, being influenced by recent WTO trade rules 
from the 2012 Geneva meetings, pharmaceutical companies are still in the process of 
“negotiating with the Brazilian government…on how or whether it will cut 
[pharmaceutical drug] prices” (Bloomberg article). If they do not wish to sell at the lower 
price the Brazilian government is setting, the US based pharmaceutical companies may 







unprofitability of operations there. Many critique pharmaceutical companies for wishing 
to protect their IP for their own profits, while withholding production in developing 
countries, leaving millions of people at risk for easily treated diseases such as 
tuberculosis and malaria, however, with extremely high research and development costs 
associated with the creation of new formulas, it is extremely important for governments 
to work with these companies to find a balance between protecting high costs research 
going uncovered and treating the consumer. 
 One might argue that because the US-Brazilian trade agreements are not officially 
FTAs that it is not equitable to compare the agreements to any other FTAs on the basis of 
IP protection measures. Although it is true that there is no US-Brazilian FTA to this date, 
it is important to understand that the same economic principles of an FTA are applied 
here in Brazil. Brazil has been a member of the WTO since 1995, which means that it 
adheres to the same TRIPS and TRIPS-Plus measures that countries in all of the 
preceding agreement are held to (wto.org). According to the 2012 Bloomberg article 
mentioned earlier, President Barack Obama has been forming more agreements with 
Brazil in order to meet his goal of doubling exports by 2015. Also, the International 
Trade Administration (ITA) of the United States stated in a detailed report how the US is 
working to reduce obstacles to trade through the creation of bilateral tax treaties, removal 
of tariffs, agreements on trade, and US participation in Brazilian infrastructure projects. 
In addition to this, the ITA also cited examples of very FTA-like investments from 
Brazilian companies in the United States. One is of Embraer, a Brazilian aircraft 
manufacturer that set up an assembly factory in Melbourne Florida in 2011 (trade.gov). 







of barriers of trade and bilaterally investing, and thus can be seen as having similar 
economic implications of an FTA. 
 One relatively recent example of a dispute over intellectual property rights 
between the US and Brazil actually had nothing to do with the pharmaceutical industry 
but eventually ended up involving many industries involved in trade with Brazil. 
According to Sewell Chan, it all began with “a long-standing trade dispute over 
American subsidies to cotton growers” which inhibited trade with Brazilian cotton 
growers. In retaliation to this Brazil came out with sanctions: 
Brazil had threatened, for example, to stop charging its farmers technology fees 
for seeds developed by American biotechnology companies and to break 
American pharmaceutical patents before their scheduled expiration. Those 
retaliatory actions would have cost American businesses up to $239 million. 
 
This policy was actually “under approval of W.T.O. arbitrators”, which meant that Brazil 
had permission to break the IP rights that they had agreed to with the United States earlier 
to protect certain pharmaceutical patents. In addition to this, Robert Z. Lawrence, a 
professor of international trade and finance at Harvard stated, “this mechanism – 
suspending intellectual property protection – gives smaller, developing countries a way to 
enforce their rights under trade rules” (Chan). According Lawrence, smaller countries 
need to use the importance of IP protection measures to developed countries as leverage 
when negotiating deals and enforcing their end of the agreement as well. This directly 
contrasts with the earlier notion that developing countries are always the weaker 
negotiators in an agreement. In fact, by using IP protection as leverage, they can make 








 This brings an interesting notion in that perhaps in order to reform the 
enforcement of IP protection and incentivize the more developed countries to work 
alongside the smaller less developed countries in improving judicial systems and 
executive powers, the countries such as Brazil should use this tactic and show that they 
hold more power when it comes to IP protection measures. Overall, this situation is an 
example of how Brazil’s agreements with the United States still have problems when it 
comes to IP protection. It seems to be susceptible to non-related political regulations, and 
also the price differences between pharmaceuticals (as is extremely common in the 
industry) leads to measures that do not help protect companies from generic 
manufacturers.  
 In sum, the US-Brazilian trade agreements, although not necessarily considered 
an FTA, are economically relevant to the discussion of IP protection. By looking at the 
pharmaceutical industry in Brazil, it is clear that the agreements do leave companies 
exposed to the influence of the government, which is a risk that those companies take on 
when doing business there. As the government intervenes in other industries, as shown in 
the agricultural industry, an interesting point on power in negotiation is brought up. In 
some cases, the developed government actually has less power in negotiations, as it has 
more incentives to trade with the cheaper, less developed country. This incentive means 
that the less developed country can gain leverage, using IP protection as a point to ask for 
favorable measures. If a country such as Brazil can threaten to break patent agreements in 
order to force the US to align with its economic agenda. The US companies, in fear of 
losing millions, can lobby the government to give into these measures. As a result, less 







threaten to break IP protection measures to gain power, which is an idea that can change 
the way countries negotiate and enforce IP protection. 
 
US-Canadian Trade Effect on IP and Pricing 
 Although many of the previous FTAs mentioned have problems that seem to stem 
from a development difference between them and the United States, the agreement 
between the US and Canada in NAFTA is an example where development does not seem 
to be the issue at hand. In 1994, NAFTA was formed as a trade agreement to lower the 
barriers between the United States, Canada, and Mexico. This allowed American and 
Canadian companies to create manufacturing facilities in Mexico at lower cost than their 
own country, and it also brought work to areas that otherwise would not be able to 
provide jobs in poorer areas in Mexico through the creation of maquiladora plants. 
Despite these positive effects of NAFTA, the controversy of the measures focused mainly 
on the IP protection. 
 In Canada, pharmaceutical drugs are price fixed through the government subsidies 
in the national healthcare system. As a result, their prices are artificially low when 
compared the Unites States’ free market prices. According to John Terry, Lou Ederer and 
Jennifer A Orange, this created a problem for American pharmaceutical companies trying 
to profit from their products in their own market: 
In 2001, internet pharmacies began to capitalize on the price difference by selling 
Canadian drug products through websites to US residents. In 2003, drug sales of 
Canadian internet pharmacies were valued at between US$600 million and US$1 
billion. In many cases, these drug products are made in the US, shipped to Canada 
for sale, and then exported back to the US by internet pharmacies. Even though 
US FDA officials have taken the position that these sales are illegal in the US, 







bulk buyers of prescription drugs propose to purchase their drug products from 
Canadian internet pharmacies. To date, Canada’s federal and provincial 
governments have taken few, if any, active steps to prevent trade by Canadian 
internet pharmacies, even though such trade is contrary to many provincial laws 
regulating pharmacies and physicians. 
 
 Because US citizens were illegally obtaining pharmaceutical products from 
Canada, the incentives for these companies to commit to their agreement and sell to 
Canada seem to have been hindered. This, however, does not seem to be a case where 
generics were created and IP was infringed. It is key to understand that there is no IP 
fraud taking place here, thus further cementing the idea that development differences are 
more likely the case in gaps in IP protection. Despite this, this example does show that 
proprietary assets of high value do show price differences between nations in an 
agreement, as noted in the Brazil trade agreements case. This price discrimination is also 
a problem that companies with IP problems often face, especially in the pharmaceutical 
industry. Although the formula has not been copied into an illegal generic, the same 
economic principle is being applied: products of the same formula are being sold in the 
market for a lower price. This problem for American pharmaceuticals costs them a large 
portion of their own markets, thus making trade relations with Canada more fragile.  
 The pharmaceutical companies expected the measures of the NAFTA agreement 
to be enforced and carried out. According to the same article above, “Article 1709(5) of 
the NAFTA requires each party to ensure that a ‘patent shall confer on the patent owner 
the rights to prevent other persons from making, using or selling the subject matter of the 
patent, without the patent owner’s consent’” (Terry, Ederer, Orange). Here, the NAFTA 







case, the intellectual property is being sold illegally under market value, without either 
country working to enforce. 
 This problem of enforcement is central to the current IP issues faced by 
companies and countries presently. This case between Canada and the United States 
shows how measures drafted in order to protect assets of high value, such as intellectual 
property, are not being enforced properly. Solving this issue is a key next step to opening 
up trade between nations of different development. In the mid 1990’s, with the 
introduction of the WTO and the TRIPS agreement, the first step was taken in protecting 
IP rights in FTAs. However, in order to complete the progression of IP protection, there 
must be full enforcement of the laws drafted in agreements. 
 In the case of NAFTA, this breach of IP trade facilitated by the agreement does 
not seem to stem from the lack of development between nations, as both Canada and the 
United States are developed countries with well enforced laws. According to the World 
Bank, in 2012 Canada and the United States were ranked the 15th and 4th respectively out 
of over 200 nations for ease of business. This survey of countries shows that both are 
very developed economies, as the main criteria for ease of business is “regulatory 
environment is conducive to business operation” (worldbank.org). Since the regulatory 
environment in both countries seems to favor business over many other countries, one 
wonders why exactly these measures are not being enforced. The illegal trade of 
pharmaceuticals from Canada seems to only continue as the price gap widens. 
 The US-Canadian trade agreement through NAFTA exemplifies the problems that 
even equally developed countries face when it comes to IP protection. Although it 







led to lower pricing, however, it seems that the pricing differences did lead to illegal 
activity concerning the enforcement of products of high value to pharmaceuticals. As a 
result, companies trying to finally capitalize on their high R&D costs for drugs cannot 
due to a lack of enforcement. Here, the IP is not being copied through formula, but rather 
it is being distributed illegally. This is but a different problem that countries of higher 
development often face in the pharmaceutical industry. It can be concluded that the 
enforcement of IP is not necessarily dependant on country development, and thus more 
measures must be taken forth in correcting this oversight in protection. 
 
US-Singaporean Agreement: A Bright Light in IP Protection 
 The US-Singaporean FTA is consistently depicted as a success in terms of IP 
protection for companies. In order to look at the success factors and apply them to 
improve the enforcement of IP rights in future agreements, one must have a full 
understanding of the conditions in which the FTA between the US and Singapore was 
drafted in. Also, one must fully understand how this situation differs from many of the 
other examples of IP protection listed above, especially when looking at the way the 
government functions in relation to these agreements. 
 First, in order to see how the FTA worked between the United States and 
Singapore, it is extremely important to understand the business environment in 
Singapore, especially in the context of IP protection for companies. According to the 
World Bank, Singapore is ranked first out of over 200 countries for “ease of doing 
business”. This basically means that the “regulatory environment is conducive to business 







protect assets (worldbank.org). The protection of assets is essential for companies that 
plan on taking advantage of the free trade in the country. These assets will include 
intellectual property, which is of extremely high value, especially for technology firms, 
who seem to have focused their work in Singapore for the time being. 
 Before Singapore entered into an FTA with the United States, the US 
International Trade Commission (ITC) completed an investigational report on the country 
and its current international trade policies. This investigation occurred in February of 
2003, just a year before the official FTA was established between the two nations. In 
particular, the ITC documented the IP protection strength as they perceived it from the 
language of the proposed FTA: 
Singapore generally is viewed as having comparatively strong IPR protection. 
The FTA sets out high standards for protection and enforcement for copyrights 
and other intellectual property and may lead to increased revenues for certain U.S. 
industries dependent on IPR. The intellectual property provisions of the FTA 
address many of the most significant concerns the U.S. industry has expressed 
regarding the IPR regime in Singapore. In general, the IPR provisions of the FTA 
go further than the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs). National treatment provisions are broad, permit no 
exceptions, and extend to “any benefits derived” from the “protection and 
enjoyment” of intellectual property of any kind. (Arona M. Butcher, 95) 
 
This part of the report shows that IP protection in Singapore is extremely strong, making 
it seem as though it is an actual comparative advantage for the country when it comes to 
foreign direct investment. Also, this report is the first to mention a country having not 
only high standards for protection, but also enforcement of IP. This shows that Singapore 
focuses not only on IP substantive law, much like other companies, but also focuses on 
the execution of those standards in practice. In particular, the ITC also analyzed the 







exceptions” are to be made to those who infringe upon the IPR (intellectual property 
rights) of a company. For example, much like Singapore, all of the DR-CAFTA nations 
had provisions that were considered TRIPS-plus in their national law. In the ITC report, 
Singapore is described as having “IPR provisions of the FTA [that] go further than the 
WTO Agreement on…(TRIPS)” (Butcher, XX). This similarity with the DR-CAFTA 
nations would lead one to believe that the enforcement of IPR in the countries would be 
similar. However, the report analyzes further into the enforcement of IPR, which is a 
topic that is not as strongly covered in the Central American countries: 
Moreover, IPR laws are to be enforced not only against infringement originating 
within each country, but also against goods in transit to deter violators from using 
ports or free-trade zones to traffic in pirated products. To improve such 
enforcement, authorities may initiate unannounced border actions. (Butcher, 99) 
 
This case shows how in order to properly enforce the IPR laws of an FTA set in place, 
the Singaporean authorities are given the power to arrest those infringing on rights 
unannounced. This is particularly useful in the trade of pirated goods, mainly because 
these operations are usually let visible, unlike in the pharmaceutical industry.  
 There are two key success factors here. One is the ability of the Singaporean 
authorities to act quickly upon a situation of IP infringement. The second success factor 
is the ability of lawmakers to foresee potential problems and create legislation tailored to 
the industries. This reflects that the legislative procedure between the two nations 
involved in the FTA worked closely, expressing their needs and expectations. In fact, the 
ITC report states, “the FTA provides for cooperation between the two governments to 
prevent pirated and counterfeit goods from being imported into each country” (Butcher, 







connecting the executive and legislative powers in creating a relevant and effective 
agreement. This sort of process is ideal, and should be applied in the future for the United 
States in helping improve the enforcement of IP protection in FTAs in particular. 
 By looking at the language within the US-Singapore FTA, one can also see some 
similarities. Article 16.1 of the agreement states that much of the wording is similar to the 
agreements mentioned before such as the DR-CAFTA. For example, the FTA states, “the 
Party shall respect the provisions… of the TRIPS Agreement”, much like DR-CAFTA 
(199). Many FTAs borrow their wordings from the WTO’s own legislation and 
agreements. As a result, the improvement in enforcement of IP protection in Singapore 
must be due to another factor.  
 The 2008 CRS Report to Congress provides one with perspective on the US-
Singapore FTA. This report was filed to investigate the changes that the FTA created a 
few years after its adoption. As shown in Exhibit 4, the balance of trade between the US 
and Singapore had a surplus in Royalties and License Fees post FTA. The report states, 
“some of the rises in fees for intellectual property likely can be attributed to strengthened 
intellectual property protection in Singapore resulting from the FTA” (CRS Report, 7). 
This indicates that the FTA increased the spending on IP protection in Singapore, and it 
did not leave companies more at risk for IP infringement.  
 This contradicts what many believe FTAs do to IPR in general. The exposure to 
the risks often associated with FTAs has been mitigated, as the Singapore agreement 
shows. The one difference apparent here is that Singapore invested substantially in the 
protection of IPR. According to the CRS report, the fees on companies to trade on 







something that has not been highlighted through any of the reports concerning the other 
countries on IPR protection. This factor could also contribute to the increased IP 
protection in the US-Singapore FTA. The CRS report notes that many new companies 
have invested in Singapore because of its increase in IP protection measures, including 
pharmaceuticals: 
Singaporean officials have indicated that the provisions in the FTA that 
strengthened IPR protection in Singapore have attracted foreign business 
investments.  Recently, Microsoft, Pfizer, ISIS Pharmaceuticals, Motorola, 
Genentech, and Lucas Films have made new investments in operations in 
Singapore. (CRS Report, 9) 
 
This supports the idea that countries can use these measures and view them as 
investments, rather than a cost of business.  
 By investing in IP protection, a country can create a competitive advantage, thus 
attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) that would otherwise be in other countries. This 
incentive should be made apparent to nations that are especially working to gain more of 
a competitive advantage in a global economy that is less likely to invest. On a whole, the 
US-Singapore FTA shows how a successful FTA can give a country a comparative 
advantage in FDI. The success factors in the Singapore agreement are based on the 
ingrained culture of business within the country. The FTA does not only have the 
measures laid out substantively, but also has the governmental unity to enforce those 










Proposal for Strengthened IP Rights Enforcement 
 Many countries in FTAs, such as Costa Rica, Chile, Brazil, and Canada discussed 
above, have not enforced the IP provisions they agreed to. It seems as though the problem 
is not only a development issue. In Costa Rica it is a greater issue than in Canada, but the 
fact that Canada actually is a developed nation does not exclude it from infringing on IP 
rights. It seems that only having provisions is not enough. In order to remedy this 
situation, there should be a fundamental change in the way that FTAs are created. 
 One major problem, as shown earlier through the example of Costa Rica, is that 
governments do not sufficiently fund enforcement agencies to support the FTA IP 
obligations. It seems, at the moment, that there is not enough pressure on countries such 
as Costa Rica to actually implement the agreed enforcement policies. For example, the 
IIPA stated in its report that “the Costa Rican government commenced efforts on [the 
government software implementation project] in 2002. Unfortunately, no real progress on 
putting such a plan in-place was made in 2009”. This project was a part of one of the 
provisions in the DR-CAFTA agreement. This shows that there is a lack of initiative for 
some countries to adhere to the agreements, although they try to take advantage of the 
benefits of the FTA. This leaves the companies prey to piracy, thus costing them millions 
a year. If this problem was addressed more clearly in the beginning of agreements, then it 
would seem that these problems would go away faster. 
 In order to fix the timeliness of applying enforcement obligations stated in FTAs, 
it there should be a timeline placed into FTAs with incentives for countries to adhere to 
the agreement. For instance, in the case of DR-CAFTA, if the FTA was signed with a 







within certain years, otherwise the agreement was nullified, then there would be incentive 
for a country like Costa Rica to resolve its enforcement problem. Currently, 
underdeveloped countries seem to be taking advantage of the job opportunities provided 
by these FTAs, but are not working enough to adequately protect the products’ designs. 
With a step-by-step schedule in the FTA language, countries such as Costa Rica would 
have to adhere to the contingency plan; otherwise they would lose the agreements. If the 
agreement is not met fully, countries or companies can choose to seek compensation or 
remedies until the schedule is met. 
 By creating this step-by-step plan, a country such as Costa Rica is given enough 
time to focus on parts of IP protection. For instance, if the government were told that it 
needed to have an IP focused police force within two years of the agreement, Costa Rica 
would have an incentive to put one in place earlier. The next step in this plan would 
slowly build on this policing force by adding infrastructure to the court system to take on 
infringement cases. What this would do is facilitate the development process for the 
weaker countries in the FTA, and also help build them correctly. As the IFAC report 
stated, in the end “the proof will lie in the implementation of these new standards on the 
ground in the country, by police, prosecutors, judges and administrative agencies 
responsible for enforcement and implementation of intellectual property rights” (IFAC 
Report, 17). By starting “on the ground”, companies would benefit the most from IP 
protection. The simplest changes in enforcement from bottom up will be the most 
effective and logical way to implement change. 
 The imbalance in development between nations in FTAs also leads to this IP 







benefit from what the other country can offer. For developed countries such as the United 
States, creating FTAs with Latin American and Asian countries allows companies to take 
advantage of lower costs of labor. For the undeveloped countries, companies provide 
capital, infrastructure, jobs, and sometimes tax revenue that otherwise would not exist. 
This all relies on the fact that the undeveloped countries will eventually adopt the 
products, infrastructure, and eventually grow into a more developed economy. This 
growth strategy in theory works, but it often faces obstacles that slow growth down, such 
as issues with IP protection. These issues deter companies from taking advantage of 
FTAs, and the countries hoping to gain the most from these agreements lose out on 
developmental growth. By focusing on growing together, all nations involved in an FTA 
stand to improve and create a more fertile economic environment. The job creation and 
business expansion would occur organically through complementary growth.  
 The current policy on infrastructure for IP protection for countries in FTAs is just 
to list the laws and obligation on the agreement, and fully expect the countries to adhere 
almost immediately. According to Elisa Walker Echenique, “When the United States or 
European Union tenders a draft PTA to a developing country, it expects the basic 
template of its proposal to be followed” (Echenique, 3). These unreasonable expectations 
hurt both parties, as the foreign companies investing lose millions in piracy, and 
underdeveloped countries do not see the gains of dealing with IP rights developed 
countries. In addition to that, “developing countries committing their legislature to 
include IP terms in their local regulation without really knowing the consequences of the 
application of those rules” (Echenique, 3). This lack of understanding can only be solved 







countries is essential in assuring that all parties understand IP protection expectations. 
Developed countries such as the United States and some European Union countries 
should work more closely with the developing countries to ensure that all expectations 
are communicated well and followed. Structuring this process assures that it occurs 
within a defined timeline, and also helps foster growth within international trade. 
 Yet another problem shown in the process by looking at the examples above is 
rooted in the process of forming Free Trade Agreements. A revision of the process, not 
just foreseeing developmental issues, as has been the past focus, is necessary to protect IP 
and promote international trade. For instance the US-Chilean FTA example illustrates a 
problem in the negotiation process. This led to US approval of an FTA without actually 
seeing if standard measures such as TRIPS were being met for IP protection. As seen 
earlier, Chile had not actually implemented its measures to protect intellectual property 
even though it was a member of the WTO. 
 
Conclusion 
 Overall, it has become clear that Free Trade Agreements involve a complicated 
process for all sides involved. By looking at key examples of Free Trade Agreements that 
leave business’ IP vulnerable to infringement, it was established that the main issues with 
protection stemmed from the inadequacy of substantive law, the gaps in the process of 
forming agreements, and the government motivations in companies involved. 
 With the example of Costa Rica in DR-CAFTA, it was evident that companies 
such as Intel were vulnerable due to the lack of enforcement “on the ground” without an 







subject of copyright law. Although Costa Rica and other DR-CAFTA nations held 
measures above the TRIPS protection, they still held multiple cases of IP infringement. 
By working on the process of development through all nations involved in the agreement, 
it would be possible to solve this issue. The step by step contingency plan seems to bring 
a balance in allowing developing nations keep track of progress and enforce manageable 
deadlines, while also giving developed nations the security that their investing companies 
desire.  
 The US-Chilean FTA also showed where the process of negotiation of treaties in 
the governments is vital to protect the Intellectual Property of companies. The analysis of 
the IFAC report showed that the gap between the branches in government during the 
process of negotiating and signing the FTA led to a miscommunication of IP standards 
and expectations, ultimately hurting IP protection and leaving companies vulnerable. By 
looking at the United States’ process as an example, it became clear the communication 
between branches of the government is essential in order to develop an FTA that is both 
fair and more enforceable.  
 The US-Brazilian trade agreements also introduced the pharmaceutical industry as 
a major stakeholder in IP protection. After looking at the ITA report, it became clear that 
in many cases, the less developed countries could gain leverage in negotiations by 
threatening infringement on IP protection. This poses as a massive problem to 
pharmaceutical and agricultural companies heavily invested in the country. As a result, it 
was concluded that in order to alleviate this threat to companies, working on a 
development plan that would align interests of nations together would be essential. 







making sure the expectations and needs of both sides of the agreement are being met 
within reasonable time periods. 
 Continuing the analysis of IP protection weaknesses, the US-Canada trade 
relations revealed problems between countries of relatively similar development. For 
pharmaceutical companies in the NAFTA agreement, one can see that even developed 
countries can pose a risk for businesses. Once again, enforcement proved to be the major 
problem in protecting companies. To improve upon this, the Canadian government needs 
to improve its process of enforcing internet sales. By providing measures of performance 
in the FTA, the United States pharmaceutical companies would be able to be better 
protected and not lose as many profits off of their valuable patented formulas. 
 By looking at the US-Singapore FTA, one could see an example of IP protection 
measures being enforced well by an organized government with defined enforcement 
procedures. These procedures are reflected in the low time necessary to reapply for patent 
extensions, and its high number 1 ranking in ease of business among all nations in the 
world. Singapore’s focus on maintaining a competitive advantage through organization 
and a unified government based on an IP protection culture gives it the edge it needs to 
attract more FDI from companies with high IP value. The key success factors involved in 
the Singaporean process were and understanding of the other countries’ expectations and 
also the recognition of the need of physical enforcement. Simply put, Singapore is 
successful because it not only substantively protects IP in the agreement, but it follows 
through by enforcing the IP protection measures, viewing them as an investment, rather 
than a cost of business. 







evolving with the companies and countries involved in Free Trade Agreements. This 
evolution began with the creation of the WTO in 1995 alongside the TRIPS measures 
specifically made to create a standard by which countries would be measured in their IP 
protection. As the years pass after these measures for IP protection establish themselves, 
it is clear that new action must be taken in order to further develop international trade 
through Free Trade Agreements. Now that enforcement has become an issue on the 
forefront of IP protection, it is only natural that countries begin to focus on improving the 
ratification processes continue protecting the assets that are most valuable to innovation, 
















































































Glossary of IP Terms Mentioned: 
FTA – Free Trade Agreement 
IP – Intellectual Property 
IPR – Intellectual Property Rights 
TRIPS – Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
DR-CAFTA – Dominican Republic & Central American Free Trade Agreement 
SEAR – South-East Asia Region 
GATT – General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
WIPO – World Intellectual Property Organization 
IFAC – Industry Functional Advisory Committee on Intellectual Property 
ITA – International Trade Administration 
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